

## Message Text

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ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-10 ISO-00 SS-15 NSC-05 HA-05  
OMB-01 TRSE-00 SP-02 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 L-03  
H-01 EB-08 MMO-01 AID-05 IO-13 PM-05 /108 W  
-----040621 131415Z /75

P R 131155Z JUN 78

FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8554

INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY DACCA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USLO PEKING

CINCPAC

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV, PEPR, PINT, AF, US

SUBJECT: MY FAREWELL CALL ON AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER

REF: A) KABUL 3635; B) KABUL 4650

1. SUMMARY: ON JUNE 12, I PAID MY FAREWELL CALL ON  
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER HAFIZULLAH  
AMIN. IT WAS MY SECOND MEETING WITH HIM SINCE THE  
NEW GOVERNMENT CAME INTO POWER SIX WEEKS AGO. AMIN  
HAD ONLY A FEW DAYS EARLIER RETURNED FROM THE UN/SSOD  
MEETING IN NEW YORK. THIS TIME HE RECEIVED ME IN THE  
PRIME MINISTRY BUILDING, PRESUMABLY TO EMPHASIZE HIS  
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ROLE (HE IS ONE OF THREE SUCH  
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DEPUTIES). HE WAS ALONE; I WAS ACCCOMPANIED BY DCM AMSTUTZ.

2. THE MEETING WENT WELL. AMIN WAS CORDIAL THROUGHOUT  
AND WE BOTH USED THE OCCASION TO RAISE SUBJECTS ON OUR MINDS.  
HE TOUCHED ON FOREIGN THREATS TO HIS REGIME, ON HIS COUNTRY'S  
INDEPENDENCE, AND ITS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE USSR. I DISCUSSED  
THE DURAND LINE, HUMAN RIGHTS (SEPTEL), AND ANTI-U.S. ARTICLES

IN THE CONTROLLED PRESS. END SUMMARY.

3. AMIN SAID HIS TRIP TO NEW YORK HAD BEEN VERY TIRING. ALTHOUGH HE HAD BEEN AWAY OVER FIVE DAYS, MOST OF THAT TIME WAS CONSUMED IN TRAVEL. HE HAD BEEN GLAD TO SEE NEW YORK AGAIN, WHERE HE HAD STUDIED A TOTAL OF FOUR YEARS AT COLUMBIA TEACHERS COLLEGE (UNDER USAID AUSPICES), AND HAD NOTED MANY CHANGES. ALTHOUGH HIS SCHEDULE HAD BEEN VERY TIGHT, HE HAD SLIPPED AWAY FOR QWO HOURS TO REVISIT COLUMBIA TEACHERS COLLEGE AND HAD SEEN ONE OF HIS OLD PROFESSORS. I JOKED WITH HIM THAT THERE WERE NOW THREE CABINET MINISTERS IN HIS GOVERNMENT WHO HAD STUDIED AT TEACHERS COLLEGE, AND THAT WHEN I NEXT VISITED THE UNIVERSITY I MEANT TO TELL THEM I HAD NOT REALIZED IT WAS SUCH A REVOLUTIONARY HOT BED. HE LAUGHED. HE ALSO SAID HE HAD ENJOYED MEETING ASST. SECRETARY SAUNDERS AND HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE TIGHT SECURITY MEASURES THE DEPARTMENT HAD ARRANGED FOR HIM.

4. AMIN THEN SAID HE HAD A NUMBER OF THINGS TO MENTION TO ME. ONE WAS THE MATTER OF FOREIGN-BASED THREATS TO HIS GOVERNMENT'S INTERNAL SECURITY. HE SAID WE WERE BOTH AWARE THERE WERE REACTIONARY "CIRCLES" ABROAD WHO WOULD LIKE TO OVERTHROW HIS GOVERNMENT AND HE HOPED THAT COUNTRIES LIKE THE U.S., INCLUDING PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS IN THOSE COUNTRIES, WOULD NOT LEND THESE GROUPS

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SUPPORT. HE SPECIFICALLY ALLUDED TO THE REPORT OUT OF RAWALPINDI ABOUT THE FORMATION OF A "NATIONAL FRONT." MOST OF THE MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS OF THAT FRONT DID NOT EXIST, HE SAID, AND HE DOUBTED DISCLAIMERS OF THE PAK GOVERNMENT THAT THEY KNEW NOTHING ABOUT THIS ORGANIZATION. "IF WE AFGHANS DO NOT PERMIT ANTI-IRANIAN GOVERNMENT OR ANTI-PAKISTANI GROUPS TO OPERATE IN AFGHANISTAN," HE SAID, "WE EXPECT OUR NEIGHBORS TO DO THE SAME TOWARDS US." I TOLD HIM THAT OUR GOVERNMENT ONLY SOUGHT FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH HIS, AND THAT IN NO WAY WERE WE SUPPORTING ANTI-DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN (DRA) ELEMENTS ABROAD. I SAID THAT IF HE EVER HAD ANY EVIDENCE OF AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR SUCH GROUPS, I HOPED HE WOULD GIVE IT TO US. HE ASKED WHETHER WE HAD ASKED THE PAKISTANIS ABOUT THE "NATIONAL FRONT." I SAID WE HAD, BUT THAT THE PAKISTANIS THEMSELVES KNEW NOTHING ABOUT IT. WHEN HE EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE LATTER POINT, I SAID I ASSUMED HE WOULD TALK TO THE PAKISTANIS.

5. AMIN WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE WISHED TO MAKE CLEAR TO ME THAT HIS COUNTRY WAS, AND WOULD REMAIN, INDEPENDENT. "THE UNITED STATES SHOULD HAVE NO DOUBTS ABOUT THIS,"

AND HE ASKED ME TO CONVEY THIS ASSURANCE TO WASHINGTON. PERHAPS PROMPTED BY MY DISCUSSION WITH PREMIER TARAKI THE DAY BEFORE, AMIN SAID HE ALSO WANTED US TO KNOW THAT HIS COUNTRY'S POSITION ON DISARMAMENT, AS ON ALL OTHER INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, HAD BEEN ARRIVED AT INDEPENDENTLY AND NOT ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE SOVIET UNION.

6. MENTION OF THE SOVIET UNION THEN LED AMIN TO EXPLAIN THE SPECIAL AFGHAN-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. HE SAID THAT NOTWITHSTANDING THE ATTITUDES OR SUSPICIONS OTHER COUNTRIES MIGHT HAVE TOWARDS THE USSR, HE COULD ONLY SAY THAT THE "AFGHAN PEOPLE" SAW THE MATTER DIFFERENTLY. THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE 60 YEARS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND THE USSR, THE SOVIET UNION HAD

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ALWAYS TREATED AFGHANISTAN PROPERLY AND AS A GOOD NEIGHBOR. NEVER ONCE HAD THE SOVIETS INTERFERED IN AFGHAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. CONSEQUENTLY, HE AND OTHERS IN HIS GOVERNMENT HAD TOTAL TRUST AND FAITH IN THE SOVIET UNION. HE WAS SURE THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NEVER BEHAVE IMPROPERLY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN. I POINTED OUT THAT NOTWITHSTANDING HIS VIEWS, MY OWN TWO-YEAR TOUR IN MOSCOW, WHICH HAD ENABLED ME TO VISIT MANY AREAS SUCH AS GEORGIA, LATVIA AND UZBEKISTAN, AND THE EXPERIENCES OF MANY OTHER COUNTRIES IN AFRICA AND EUROPE, INDICATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD A LONG HISTORY OF MEDDLING IN OTHER COUNTRIES' AFFAIRS AND THAT IT WAS TODAY THE PRINCIPAL IMPERIALIST POWER IN THE WORLD. I COULD ONLY HOPE THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD BE ALERT TO AND AWARE OF THIS HISTORY. AMIN DID NOT REPLY.

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

7. AMIN'S LAST POINT CONCERNED ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION. REPEATING WHAT PREMIER TARAKI AND OTHER HAD SAID TO US, HE SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WANTED US TO CONTINUE OUR ECONOMIC AID. "BUT THIS SHOULD BE ON A GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT BASIS," AMIN SAID. "WE ARE NOT VERY INTERESTED IN DEALING WITH PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS, FOR EXAMPLE, THE ROCKEFELLER OR MORGAN (SIC) FOUNDATIONS." HE DID NOT ELABORATE, BUT I READ THIS AS A SIGNAL THAT THE ASIA FOUNDATION AND PERHAPS PRIVATE ENTERPRISES LIKE CITIES SERVICE MAY NO LONGER BE WELCOME HERE.

8. I THEN RAISED SEVERAL MATTERS WITH AMIN. ONE AFGHAN/PAK RELATIONS, I SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN A LONG-  
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STANDING POLICY OF OURS TO ENCOURAGE HIS COUNTRY AND PAKISTAN TO LIVE IN PEACE AND TO SETTLE THEIR DIFFERENCES. WE WERE CONSEQUENTLY NOW DISTURBED BY PRESS AND PRIVATE STATEMENTS BY DRA LEADERS WHICH SUGGESTED THAT THE PUSHTUNISTAN ISSUE WAS BEING REVIVED BY HIS GOVERNMENT. SPECIFICALLY, I MENTIONED THAT AN AMBASSADORIAL COLLEAGUE OF MINE HAD BEEN TOLD BY HIS FRONTIER AFFAIRS MINISTER THAT THE DURAND LINE WAS NOT RECOGNIZED BY HIS GOVERNMENT AND THAT THE BOUNDARY SHOULD BE THE INDUS RIVER. I SAID THAT I WANTED TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO HIM AND HIS GOVERNMENT THAT THE U.S. RECOGNIZES THE EXISTING BOUNDARY BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN AS THE LEGITIMATE INTERNATIONAL BORDER.

9. IN ANSWER, AMIN SAID THAT THE MOST AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENT MADE BY THE DRA ON ITS RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN WAS PREMIER TARAKI'S MAY 7 SPEECH, OUTLINING THE DRA'S 30-POINT PROGRAM. NEXT TO PREMIER TARAKI,

HE, AMIN, WAS THE PROPER SPOKESMAN OF THE GOVERNMENT ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES. WE SHOULD, THEREFORE, NOT GIVE TOO MUCH CREDENCE TO WHAT OTHERS IN THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT SAY ON THE SUBJECT. SOME OF THE DRA LEADERSHIP WERE NEW AND INEXPERIENCED AND, HE SAID, HAD STRONG EMOTIONAL FEELINGS ON THE ISSUE.

10. IN GIVING THIS EXPLANATION, AMIN CAREFULLY AVOIDED SAYING ANYTHING CONCRETE ABOUT THE PUSHTUNISTAN ISSUE. HE INTIMATED, HOWEVER, THAT A BOUNDARY PROBLEM DID EXIST AND THAT IT WAS HIS GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE TO BRING ABOUT A CHANGE. BY WAY OF ILLUSTRATION, HE REFERRED SEVERAL TIMES TO OUR RECENT SETTLEMENT ON THE PANAMA CANAL AS AN EXAMPLE OF LONG, DRAWN-OUT NEGOTIATIONS WHICH FINALLY BROUGHT FRUIT. "THE PUSHTUNISTAN ISSUE MAY NOT BE

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SETTLED IN WEEKS OR MONTHS, AND PERHAPS NOT FOR YEARS," HE SAID, "BUT WE ARE PREPARED TO BE PATIENT AND WISH TO RESOLVE THE MATTER BY PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS."

11. THE LAST MATTER I RAISED WITH AMIN HAD TO DO WITH THE MARKED INCREASE IN ANTI-U.S. ARTICLES APPEARING IN THE VERNACULAR AND ENGLISH-LANGUAGE PRESS. I SAID THAT THIS WAS DISTURBING IN THE LIGHT OF HIS GOVERNMENT'S PROTESTATIONS OF WANTING U.S. FRIENDSHIP. SOME OF THE ARTICLES SEEMED INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM PROPAGANDA COMING OUT OF MOSCOW. I SAID I WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED BY A PROMINENT ARTICLE IN THE "KABUL TIMES" OF JUNE 11 WHICH CASTIGATED THE "IMPERIALISTS" FOR IGNORING THE AFGHAN FAMINE OF 1970 AND FOR OUR ALLEGED HABIT OF "CALLING OUT THE MARINES" TO IMPOSE OUR WILL. THE FRDT WAS, I TOLD HIM, THAT THE U.S. GAVE MASSIVE FOOD AID TO AFGHANISTAN TO MEET THAT FAMINE; AS FOR CALLING OUT THE MARINES, THAT PERIOD IN OUR HISTORY WAS LONG PAST, AND THAT IN THESE DAYS THE CRY OF THE NEW IMPERIALISTS IS "CALLING OUT THE CUBANS." AMIN REACTED TO THIS WITH A BRIEF NERVOUS SMILE AND WENT ON TO GIVE THE LAME AND HARDLY CONVINCING EXPLANATION THAT HIS GOVERNMENT COULD NOT FULLY CONTROL ITS PRESS.

12. WE PARTED AMICABLY WITH MUTUAL EXPRESSIONS OF GOOD WISHES. HE SAID HE LOOKED FORWARD TO MEETING MY SUCCESSOR AND HOPED OUR TWO COUNTRIES COULD REMAIN GOOD FRIENDS. PARROTING THE GOVERNMENT'S STANDARD LINE, HE SAID THAT AFGHANISTAN'S FRIENDSHIP TOWARD OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD, OF COURSE, BE PROPORTIONAL TO THE FRIENDSHIP AND SUPPORT IT RECEIVED FROM RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES ABROAD.

13. COMMENT: IN REVIEWING OUR CONVERSATION, I THINK THE  
MOST SIGNIFICANT THINGS AMIN SAID WERE THREE. ONE WAS  
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THE REFERENCE TO THE PANAMA CANAL NEGOTIATIONS AS THEY WAY TO  
SETTLE THE PUSHTUNISTAN QUESTION, IMPLYING AS I SEE IT  
PAKISTAN GIVING UP SOME TERRIORY. ANOTHER WAS HIS MESSAGE THAT  
NON-GOVERNMENTAL AID WOULD NOT REALLY BE WELCOME IN  
AFGHANISTAN, WHICH SUGGESTS A SMALL FUTURE ROLE HERE FOR THE  
ASIA FOUNDATION AND PERHAPS ALSO FOR PRIVATE FOREIGN  
INVESTMENT. LASTLY, HIS GOVERNMENT'S EVIDENT NERVOUSNESS  
ABOUT EXPATRIATE OPPOSITION GROUPS GETTING AID FROM FOREIGN  
GOVERNMENTS INDICATES THE DRA STILL FEELS VERY INSECURE.

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## Message Attributes

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**Decapton Date:** 01 jan 1960  
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**Review Release Event:** n/a  
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**TAGS:** PGOV, PEPR, PINT, SHUM, AF, US, UR, (AMIN, HAFIZULLAH)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkvgwkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/6a62498a-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
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